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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - (Secret attachment)

INR/OIL/CS - Mr. Lawson A. Moyer, Jr.

October 28, 1971

ARA/BR - Robert W. Dean

Current Intelligence Reporting List

This office has no suggestions for changes in the upcoming CIRL, with the obvious exception that the portion of Internal Affairs 6 regarding the status of Carlos Lamarca should be dropped in view of his recent demise.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.3
NW 44281
By DM/LM, NARA, Date 4/14/15

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ARA/BR:EWSavage:me:10/28/71

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ARA/BR - Mr. Robert *[Signature]*

DATE: Oct 15, 1971

FROM : INR/OIL/CS - Lawson A. Moyer, Jr. *LA M* - Room 6638

SUBJECT: Current Intelligence Reporting List

Issued three times a year, the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) is a compendium of strictly current intelligence needs. (Items of long-range interest belong in the Intelligence Reporting Guide, an annual publication.) The CIRL sets forth categories of information believed to be obtainable from human sources, publications, and broadcasts. It is disseminated to the Department of State, FBIS, and other components of the intelligence community. It is hoped that by means of the CIRL a meaningful dialogue between Washington and the field will be stimulated. For their part, collectors are to view the CIRL as complementary to their specific instructions and not as a mandate for collection. The collector may determine in the light of the shifting local situation whether any of these items may justifiably be included as substitutions in or additions to his program of reporting. (The CIRL should not be confused with the IFC country lists, which involve clandestine collection.)

While we do not participate in the preparation of the CIRLs on a regular, formal basis, certain areas of the Department and INR have expressed an interest in doing so voluntarily. If you elect to contribute, you may make your suggestions in writing on the appropriate pages of the attached copy of the CIRL. If you wish, you may use the CIRL to express appreciation for information received or to provide short background analysis to keep collectors apprised of the current thinking of Washington end users.

Receipt of your recommendations (if any) by Oct 28 will be appreciated in order that they may be incorporated in the next issuance of the CIRL.

Attachment:
Obsolescent CIRL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

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Latin America CIRL-LA2-71
1 August--30 November 1971

BRAZIL

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Does President Medici have support of most of the Brazilian military? Is there a significant difference in his support from general officers and that given by lower ranking ones? (C)

2. There are indications that the National Intelligence Service (SNI), the Presidential Military and Civilian Households, and the Special Presidential Advisory Office are playing major roles in the administration. How much influence does each have, and to what degree does this influence encroach upon the President's authority? (C)

3. To what extent is the church becoming more active in public affairs? What is the attitude of military and security officials toward Medici's attempts to alleviate problems with the church? What efforts are being made inside and outside the church to curb criticism of the Government by progressive clergymen? Has there been any change in the degree of involvement of clergymen with terrorist groups as to numbers, influence, and potential for growth? (C)

4. Has intraparty factionalism significantly damaged the effectiveness of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB)? Aged PCB Secretary General Luis Carlos Prestes may have given up actual leadership of the party. Who is likely to replace him, and what changes in the PCB may Prestes' departure bring? What evidence is there that the PCB is reviving its apparatus among students and labor groups and at the state and municipal levels? To what extent are Communists and other extreme leftists succeeding in exploiting dissatisfaction among workers? How is this reflected in union activities, particularly in union elections? To what degree has the PCB developed a paramilitary capability? (C)

5. What is the level of the influence and activity of Acao Popular, Communist groups, and other political elements in the universities and secondary schools? How are student political activities financed? Assess the support of the National Students' Union (UNE) at the faculty, university, state, and national levels. Is there any chance that student unrest could develop into a significant problem for the Medici administration? Has Minister of Education Passarinho had any

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1 August--30 November 1971

BRAZIL

INTERNAL AFFAIRS (Continued)

success in his attempts to bridge the wide gulf between the administration and students? What is the attitude of the military toward his efforts? What reaction was there to Passarinho's comment that some torture might have occurred but that when it did it was not Government policy? (C)

6. The death of terrorist leader Carlos Marighella and subsequent widespread arrests of leftist extremists have hit subversive groups hard, including the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR), the National Liberating Action (ALN), and the Revolutionary Brazilian Communist Party (PCBR). To what degree has police repression forced the groups to merge? What is the present status of renegade Army Captain Carlos Lamarca? (C) *- Very dead*

7. How is Delfim Neto currently perceived by Medici and other military leaders? How is Gibson Barboza perceived by the same group? What is the current state of relations between Gibson and Delfim? (C)

8. Many terrorist leaders who have been released by the Brazilian Government in exchange for abducted diplomats have gone to Cuba and Algeria. What are the current activities of these individuals, and do they plan to return to Brazil to renew their anti-Government efforts? Have any of these countries increased their financial and other types of assistance to Brazilian subversive groups? (S)

9. Are Leonel Brizola, Miguel Arraes, Francisco Juliao, and other prominent Brazilian exiles continuing their attempts to discredit the Medici government? (U)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1. There are indications that some degree of nationalism, and possibly anti-US sentiment, may be spreading in the Medici administration, particularly over economic issues. Report on the extent and reasons for this nationalism. Who are key individuals within the Government who hold these views? Estimate their impact on policymaking. What is the status of relations between such civilian officials and like-minded military men? What groups in business circles share this ultranationalistic view? (C)

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BRAZIL

FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Continued)

2. In what ways does Brazil plan to assert a claim to leadership in Latin America, particularly ones that might affect US interests in other Latin American countries? How is Brazil attempting to use the 200-mile territorial waters issue to strengthen its claim to such leadership? Have there been any variations in Brazilian attitudes toward regional integration? (C)

3. Have there been any important changes in the attitudes of Government leaders, military officers, church leaders, and leaders of other key sectors toward the path taken by the Allende administration in Chile? Are there plans for any sort of military intervention in Chile in the event of a marked leftward trend? (C)

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

1. Recent reporting indicates that adjustable mortgage payments--periodically increased to reflect inflation--may have created an excessive burden for many Brazilian home purchasers. The naming of a new National Housing Bank president may reflect problems in the bank and a policy change may be in the making. How serious is the adjusted payments problem? Are foreclosures increasing? Has this situation affected the ability of savings and loan entities to attract funds? (U)

2. Brazil's claim to a 200-mile territorial sea zone is the most important current problem affecting US-Brazilian relations. There appears to be a dichotomy between Brazil's adamant public posture on this issue and private assurances that it wishes to avoid a confrontation. The extension of the International Coffee Agreement by the US Congress has been tied to the solution of this problem, making the issue even more inflammatory. Is there any evidence that Brazil's position is in the process of change? Is a short-run compromise possible? Is the press controlled? (S)

3. Czechoslovakia extended a \$60 million line of credit in 1961. Contracts for a powerplant in Sao Paulo, machinery, and university equipment totaling \$27 million were negotiated, and some deliveries under the credits have been

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BRAZIL

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (Continued)

recorded. Poland extended a \$70 million line of credit in 1962. Contracts for ships, rails, and university equipment totaling \$57.5 million were negotiated--probably under the credits--and some drawings have been recorded. Are these credits still available, or have they expired? If they are still outstanding, are any deliveries being made under them? (S)

4. In October 1970, the USSR signed a \$12.5 million contract to provide generators for the Capivari hydroelectric powerplant in Sao Paulo State. Later reporting mentions Soviet aid of up to \$150 million for power development in Sao Paulo. What is the extent of Soviet participation in construction of the Capivari plant? Is the purchase of generators mentioned above being financed under the \$100 million Soviet credit agreement of 1966? (C)

MILITARY AFFAIRS

1. Identify individual military officers who regard themselves, or are regarded by others, as proponents of the so-called "hard line." What action are these officers taking to gain wider acceptance of their views and to influence political developments? What role, if any, does Vice President Rademaker have in the group? (U)

2. What indications are there that a strong nationalistic spirit, with possible anti-US overtones, may become an important influence among the Brazilian Armed Forces, particularly among middle-grade officers? What influence does the officers' nationalism have on the Government's handling of the 200-mile territorial waters issue? (C)

3. Is the Government planning any major new purchases of military equipment from non-US sources? Is there additional information on the terms of any contracts that have been signed, especially the one with France for Mirage jet fighters? (C)

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